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I. INTRODUCTION
In the wake of corporate scandal, regulators worldwide responded with
new mandates and reforms in an effort to reinstate trust and certainty in the
marketplace. Those reforms are now challenged by the current credit
crisis. This article compares the modern corporate regulatory environments
in the United States and Australia, including an analysis of the climate
for Directors & Officers (D & O) liability coverage. Comparing these
regulations across two large markets with similar historical bases for
assessing director and officer liability allows us to explore which reforms
may be more effective as new scandals emerge.
In the United States, corporate governance laws have evolved gradually
since the 1950s,1 but 2002 brought the most dramatic change with the
1. See ABA Committee on Corporate Compliance, Corporate Compliance
Survey, 60 BUS. LAW. 1759, 1760 (2005); Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis,
Minimizing Corporate Civil and Criminal Liability: A Second Look at Corporate Codes
of Conduct, 78 GEO. L.J. 1559, 1578 (1990); John D. Copeland, The Tyson Story:
Building an Effective Ethics and Compliance Program, 5 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 305, 311
(2000); Charles J. Walsh & Alisa Pyrich, Corporate Compliance Programs as a Defense
to Criminal Liability: Can a Corporation Save its Soul, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 605, 650
(1995).
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Sarbanes-Oxley Act.2 Similarly, in Australia, corporate law has evolved
gradually over the last several decades with recent updates in response
to managerial wrongdoing. 3 Now, the global economic downturn
has brought new scandal to both markets. Given that both governments
drafted their regulatory reforms in the context of multiple scandals that
demolished investor confidence, a comparison between the two systems’
corporate governance programs4 should inform future outcomes and help
determine which system better accomplishes its desired goals.
We begin in Section II by describing the corporate scandals that
spawned new legislation in order to illustrate the context in which each
government drafted their respective reforms. In Section III, we evaluate
these reforms for similarities and differences. In Section IV we analyze
how each country’s regulatory schemes may impact D & O liability.
Finally, we conclude by exploring what the future may hold for American
and Australian corporate governance in light of the current credit crisis
and beyond.
II. MODERN CORPORATE SCANDALS IN THE
UNITED STATES AND AUSTRALIA
A. Current Credit Crisis
1. The United States
While many of the scandals at the end of the 1990s involved
accounting improprieties, the current crisis stems from distortions in the
real estate market. After the bursting of the technology bubble, a new
bubble developed in residential real estate in the United States.5 The
explosion in home prices was partly driven by the securitization of home

2. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 & 29 U.S.C.) [hereinafter SOX].
3. See Roman Tomasic, The Modernisation of Corporations Law: Corporate Law
Reform in Australia and Beyond, 19 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 2, 60 (2006).
4. See HarrisBeach.com, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002—Legal Alert, Aug.
2002, http://www.harrisbeach.com/news/articleviewer.cfm?aid=175; Larelle Chapple &
Boyce Koh, Regulatory Responses to Auditor Independence Dilemmas—Who takes the
Stronger Line, 21 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 6 (2007).
5. Nelson D. Schwartz & Vikas Bajaj, Credit Time Bomb Ticked, but Few Heard,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2007, at A1.
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mortgages.6 Securitization is a process which involves pooling income
streams or receivables, such as payments on a mortgage, and selling
securities backed by those payments.7 In a typical transaction, the lender,
commonly referred to as an originator in securitization parlance, assigns
a loan to a subsidiary of an investment bank.8 In exchange for the
receivable, the originator receives a lump sum payment.9 The subsidiary,
in turn, combines that loan with hundreds of other loans in a special
purpose vehicle (SPV).10 The SPV then sells securities backed by payments
on the underlying mortgages.11 These securities resemble other debt
instruments and are typically traded among large, institutional investors.12
Although the process existed for some time, the securitization of
mortgages gained new prominence as investment banks reaped huge
profits by packaging home mortgages into securities and selling them to
investors with a seemingly endless appetite. 13 Banks sold these
securities to all parts of the financial system, including insurance
companies, hedge funds, and other foreign investors.14 Additionally,
many American investment banks that manufactured these securities
held these assets on their books.15
While a full recounting of the ensuing crisis is beyond the scope of
this article, the market for mortgage-backed securities simply suffered a
systemic failure. Beginning in 2007, the national housing market experienced
dramatic turmoil.16 At the center of the storm were subprime mortgages—
loans made to individuals with poor credit or little credit history.17
Rising defaults from subprime borrowers and questions about the ability
of other borrowers to repay their loans raised questions about the value

6. Ben Steverman & David Bogoslaw, The Financial Crisis Blame Game,
BUSINESSWEEK, Oct. 10, 2008, available at http://www.businessweek.com/investor/content/
oct2008/pi20081017_950382.htm.
7. See Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance, 28 CARDOZO L.
R EV . 2185, 2186–87 (2007); Lois R. Lupica, Asset Securitization: The Unsecured
Creditor’s Perspective, 76 TEX. L. REV. 595, 599–600 (1998).
8. Peterson, supra note 7, at 2209; Lupica, supra note 7, at 600.
9. Lupica, supra note 7, at 600.
10. Peterson, supra note 7, at 2209.
11. Id.
12. Aaron Unterman, Exporting Risk: Global Implications of the Securitization of
U.S. Housing Debt, 4 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 77, 80 (2008).
13. Id.
14. Peterson, supra note 7, at 2188.
15. Edmund L. Andrews, Troubled Assets Still on Books Could Pose Risk, Panel
Says, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2009, at B2.
16. Nelson D. Schwartz & Vikas Bajaj, supra note 5.
17. Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law
and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1261 (2002).
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of the securities held throughout Wall Street. Furthermore, fraudulent
practices by some in the mortgage industry meant that some borrowers
took on mortgages that they had no ability to repay.18 Together, these
factors lead to a steep decline in the value of these mortgage-backed
securities. 19 Because investment banks used the mortgage-backed
securities as collateral for loans to take on additional risk, many suffered
a classic “run on the bank” from their creditors and trading partners.20
2. Australia
Although the mortgage-backed securities crisis originated on Wall
Street, the effects of the crisis have spread throughout the global
financial system. Financial institutions of all shapes and sizes, including
those in Australia, purchased these securities of diminishing value.21 In
addition, the machinery of securitization around the world ground to a
halt, preventing companies from raising new funds or rolling over existing
debt.22 Australian financial institutions, like their American counterparts,
were unable to use securitization to make new home loans.23
18. See generally Lois R. Lupica, The Consumer Debt Crisis and the
Reinforcement of Class Position, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 557 (2009) (examining the causes
of the credit crisis and focusing on the overextension of consumer credit in the
residential real estate market).
19. See The Economic Outlook: Testimony Before the J. Econ. Comm., 110th
Cong. (2008) (testimony of Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/bernanke20080402a.htm (noting that
“large financial institutions . . . have reported substantial losses and writedowns” of
mortgage-backed securities).
20. See, e.g., Landon Thomas Jr., Run on Big Wall Street Bank Spurs Rescue
Backed by U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/15/
business/15bear.html (describing the run on Bear Stearns); see also SEC OFFICE OF THE
CHIEF ACCOUNTANT DIVISION OF CORPORATE FINANCE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
PURSUANT TO SECTION 133 OF THE EMERGENCY ECONOMIC STABILIZATION ACT OF 2008:
STUDY ON M ARK - TO -M ARKET A CCOUNTING in Lizabeth Ann R. Eisen, Securities
Offerings 2009: What Counsel Need to Know to Get Deals Done in Challenging Markets,
1734 PLI/CORP 283, 297 (Apr. 23–24, 2009) (claiming that the credit crisis was triggered
by “a ‘run on the bank’ at certain institutions”).
21. See generally Berkely Cox & Jeremy Green, Securitisation in Australia in
GLOBAL SECURITISATION AND STRUCTURED FINANCE 2008, available at http://www.global
securitisation.com/08_GBP/GBP_GSSF08_091_098_Australia.pdf.
22. RESTORING CONFIDENCE IN SECURITIZATION MARKETS, SEC. INDUSTRY FIN.
MARKET ASS’N, Dec. 3, 2008, at 6, available athttp://www.sifma.org/capital_markets/
docs/Survey- Restoring-confidence-securitization-markets.pdf.
23. Wietske Blees, Grinding to a Halt, RISK MAG., Sept. 1, 2008, available at
http://www.risk.net/public/showPage.html?page=814352.
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B. Accounting Scandal & Sarbanes-Oxley
1. The United States
Before the current credit crisis however, the U.S. had a series of
striking scandals so impactful that they lead to the overhaul in corporate
governance regulation that we now know as Sarbanes-Oxley, commonly
referred to as SOX. Sarbanes Oxley was a major piece of legislation
passed in 2002 and named for sponsors Senator Paul Sarbanes and
Representative Michael Oxley. Although a full review of Sarbanes Oxley
is beyond the scope of this article, it made significant changes to the
accounting practices of public companies. Among other matters, SOX
impacts the relationship between auditors and public companies,24 and
corporate governance practices that touch on financial reports and
internal controls.25 SOX also establishes stiff penalties for violations of
its provisions.26
The “line leader” in the accounting scandals that produced SOX was
Enron, formerly one of the largest international traders of electricity and
natural gas.27 The Enron scandal emerged from a deadly combination of
unsuccessful partnerships that produced excessive debt, which, in turn,
led to misleading financial reporting.28 As the company fell apart, stock
prices plummeted, creating a downward spiral.29 Eventually, Enron filed
for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The misleading statements and fraudulent
acts did not stop at Enron’s boardroom, but encompassed their
accounting firms as well. Arthur Andersen, one of the biggest
accounting firms, was to ensure that investors could rely on Enron’s
financial statements.30 On June 15, 2002, however, the government
convicted Arthur Andersen of obstruction of justice for its involvement
with Enron, including the shredding of pertinent documents. Arthur

24. SOX, supra note 2, § 203.
25. SOX, supra note 2, § 301.
26. SOX, supra note 2, § 802.
27. Timeline of Enron’s Collapse, WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 2002, http://www.
washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&node=&contentId=A25624-2002Jan
10&notFound=true. Enron evidenced its undiscriminating approach to canvassing politics by
hiring Linda Robertson, formerly with the Clinton administration, to head its Washington
office as Vice President for Federal Government affairs exactly one month following Lay’s
personal contribution to Bush’s campaign. See also Robert O’Harrow, Jr. & Lucy Shackelford,
Understanding Enron, WASH. POST, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/business/enron/
front.html.
28. Robert O’Harrow, Jr. & Lucy Shackelford supra note 27.
29. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Enron and the Use and Abuse of Special Purpose
Entities in Corporate Structures, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1309, 1310 (2002).
30. See O’Harrow & Shackelford, supra note 27.
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Andersen was the first accounting firm ever to be convicted of a
felony.31
As fraud and corruption involving Enron and its accounting firm
surfaced, on July 21, 2002, WorldCom, a leading international
communications network, took Enron’s title as the largest Chapter 11
bankruptcy filing in history.32 Enron and WorldCom had in common an
unfortunate effort by officers to conceal and misstate financial
information to make profits appear larger. Enron executives accomplished
this fraud by utilizing off-balance sheet transactions to shift debt off of
the books through various fraudulent partnerships and then shredding
incriminating documents with the assistance of Arthur Andersen.33 The
methodology utilized by WorldCom was far more basic, but no less
fraudulent. Worldcom’s executives—Bernard Ebbers, Scott Sullivan,
and others—inflated earnings in two ways. First, by capitalizing
expenditures on the balance sheet that should have been recorded as
expenses on the income statement, they deferred expenses and inflated
net income.34 Second, typically after the end of each quarter and just
before their audit or review, they booked large entries to record revenue
that had never been earned.35 The executives frequently reassured the
public that the company’s impressive growth rate was sustainable, but,
as it turns out, those growth rates were sustained only by increasingly
overinflated revenue.36
Before the public could recover from the news of these frauds, Tyco, a
maker of equipment for various industries (including electrical, fire and
security, healthcare, and telecommunications), became embroiled in a
similar scandal involving financial misstatements and a blatant misuse of
corporate funds. On September 12, 2002, the government indicted
31. N. Craig Smith & Michelle Quirk, From Grace to Disgrace: the Rise & Fall of
Arthur Anderson, 1 J. BUS. ETHICS EDUC. 91, 91 (2004). However, the conviction of
Arthur Anderson was later overturned due to a finding of error in the jury instructions.
Bill Mears, Arthur Andersen Conviction Overturned, CNN, May 31, 2005, http://www.
cnn.com/2005/LAW/05/31/scotus.arthur.andersen/.
32. WorldCom Company Timeline, WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 2005, http://www.washington
post.com/wp-dyn/articles/A49156-2002Jun26_3.html.
33. O’Harrow & Shackelford, supra note 27.
34. Dennis R. Beresford, Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, & C.B. Rogers, Jr., Report of
Investigation, S PECIAL I NVESTIGATIVE C OMM . OF THE B OARD OF D IRECTORS OF
WORLDCOM, INC. at 11, Mar. 31, 2003, available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/
data/723527/000093176303001862/dex991.htm#ex991902_2.
35. Id. at 13–15.
36. Id. at 13.
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former Tyco CEO, Dennis Kozlowski, and CFO, Mark Swartz, for selling
stock at artificially inflated prices, as well as taking $170 million for
personal use through improper bonuses and forgiven company loans.37
Similarly, executives from Adelphia Communications Corp., a cable
TV operator, and ImClone, the maker of a cancer drug, both suffered the
same fate. Adelphia’s founder, John Rigas, and his family spent over $1
billion for personal expenses.38 ImClone Chairman, Sam Waksal, and
his family and friends sold millions of dollars of stock immediately
before the FDA announced it would not approve the company’s cancer
drug.39 Eventually, the ImClone scandal ensnared Martha Stewart, who
sold 3,000 shares of ImClone stock immediately prior to the FDA
disclosure.40
In addition to financial malfeasance at some of America’s largest
companies, many major investment banking firms put their own profits
ahead of their clients’ interests.41 For example, several investment banks
issued positive research reports on companies to win investment banking
business while privately telling favored clients that the companies were
not on solid footing. Because of these practices, on May 21, 2002, the
New York Attorney General, in association with the Securities Exchange
Commission (SEC), forced Merrill Lynch to agree to a series of penalties
for misleading investors.42 These penalties included structural reform,
production of a statement of contrition, and payment of a $100 million
fine.43 Salomon Smith Barney, like Merrill Lynch, has also misled its clients
and the larger investing public.44 The National Association of Securities
Dealers (NASD) found that Salomon Smith Barney issued misleading
37. Andrew Ross Sorkin, 2 Top Tyco Executives Charged With $600 Million
Fraud Scheme, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2002, at A1, available at http://query.nytimes.
com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B00E0DF1131F930A2575AC0A9649C8B63. Tyco,
as a corporation, was not charged because the wrongdoing was limited to specific
officers within Tyco. Id.
38. Ex-ImClone Boss Charged with Fraud, BBC N EWS , June 12, 2002,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/2041385.stm [hereinafter Imclone Fraud]; Jurors Begin
Deliberations in Adelphia Fraud Trial, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2004, at C2, available at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C06E1DF1538F93AA15755
C0A9629C8B63.
39. See Imclone Fraud, supra note 38.
40. Id.
41. William H. Donaldson, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Testimony
Concerning Global Research Analyst Settlement Before the Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs (May 7, 2003) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/testimony/ts050703whd.htm).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Salomon Pays the NASD Piper, FORBES.COM, Sept. 23, 2002, http://www.
forbes.com/2002/09/23/0923grubman.html.
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research reports on Winstar Communications and levied a $5 million
fine. 45 Ultimately, ten Wall Street firms, including some of the
most venerable names in American finance, agreed to $875 million
in disgorgement and civil penalties.46
2. Australia
The United States was not alone in its corporate failures. In the first
half of 2001, Australia saw HIH Insurance, One.Tel, and Harris-Scarfe
fall.47 Like their American counterparts, these scandals involved inadequate
disclosures and accounting problems.48
HIH Insurance was founded in 1968 and went public in 1992.49 HIH
comprised several separate government–licensed insurance companies,
including HIH Casualty and General Insurance Limited, FAI General
Insurance Company Limited (FAI), CIC Insurance Limited (CIC), and
World Marine and General Insurances Limited (WMG).50 HIH wrote
many types of insurance policies in Australia, the USA, and the UK. In
Australia, HIH’s practice included compulsory insurance (such as workers’
compensation and compulsory third party motor vehicle insurance) and
non–compulsory insurance (such as home contents and travel insurance).51
As early as 1992, HIH’s accounting practices drew questionable
attention. On June 4, 1992, British insurance broker CE Heath wrote off
45% of its under–performing subsidiary—CE Heath International

45. Id.
46. SEC Fact Sheet on Global Analyst Research Settlements, http://www.sec.
gov/news/speech/factsheet.htm (last visited May 5, 2009).
47. Jennifer G. Hill, Regulatory Responses to Global Corporate Scandals, 23 WIS.
INT’L L.J. 367 (2005); Paul von Nessen, Corporate Governance in Australia: Converging
with International Developments, 15 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2003); Bonnie Buchanan,
Australian Corporate Casualties, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ADVANCES IN FINANCIAL
ECONOMICS 55, 55 (2004).
48. See Buchanan, supra note 47.
49. The full corporate history of HIH can be found in HIH Royal Commission.
Neville Owen, REPORT OF THE HIH ROYAL COMMISSION, Commonwealth of Australia,
pt. 2, ch. 3 (2003), available at http://hihroyalcom.gov.au/ (HIH Royal Commission).
50. David Kehl, HIH Insurance Group Collapses, Nov. 29, 2001, http://www.
aph.gov.au/library/intguide/econ/hih_insurance.htm. See also Gregor Allan, The HIH
Collapse: A Costly Catalyst for Reform, 11 DEAKIN L. REV. 137 (2006) and Jean du
Plessis, Reverberations After the HIH and Other Recent Australian Corporate Collapses:
The Role of ASIC, 15 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 225 (2003).
51. Kehl, supra note 50.
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Holdings Ltd.—a precursor to HIH, on the stock exchange.52 A due
diligence report prepared by Ernst and Young regarding the merger found
there was not a “prudential margin,” but the merger proceeded nonetheless.53
Insurers frequently incorporate a “prudential margin” when calculating a
provision for outstanding claims so that the provisions exceed the central
estimate of such claims, or the mean of the distribution of possible
outcomes based on historical claims. Such a cautious approach was not
followed by HIH, resulting in harsh criticism by the Royal Commission.54
The ultimate nail in the coffin for HIH, however, came in 1998 when
HIH began a formal takeover of FAI Insurance Ltd.55 HIH completed
the takeover in January 1999.56 However, early 1999 marked records for
natural disasters, declining premiums, and low interest rates, resulting in
a profit decline for HIH of 39%.57 Losses mounted and share prices
dropped. In 2000, the news worsened as questions of failure to disclose
information to shareholders arose.58 By September of 2000, regulators
suspended trading of HIH shares. Trading was suspended again in
February 2001 as Standard and Poors dropped HIH’s credit rating and
losses continued to skyrocket.59 By March 2001, HIH was in liquidation
and an investigation was launched by May 2001.60
At almost the same time, in April of 2001, Harris-Scarfe, Australia’s
third largest retail group, collapsed.61 At the time of its liquidation, it had
been in operation for 150 years.62 The story sounds remarkably familiar,
with allegations of overstated profits and false financial statements.63
Harris-Scarfe’s losses set records, including a debt of $65 million
(Australian) to ANZ bank.64

52. Id.
53. See Buchanan, supra note 47.
54. Deborah DeMott, Inside the Corporate Veil: The Character and Consequences of
Executives’ Duties, NELLCO Legal Scholarship Repository, at 14, available at http://lsr.
nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1046&context=duke_fs (last visited Mar. 30, 2010).
55. See id.
56. Kehl, supra note 50.
57. Buchanan, supra note 47.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Kehl, supra note 50.
61. Buchanan, supra note 47, at 61.
62. Philomena Leung & Barry J. Cooper, The Mad Hatter’s Corporate Tea Party,
18 MANAGERIAL AUDITING J. 505 (2003).
63. Id.
64. Buchanan, supra note 47. For a recent discussion of the effect of this failure
and claims made against the D & O insurance of directors, see Debra Lane, Court
Appoints Liquidators to Enable Claims Under D & O Policy, 22 AUSTL. INS. L. BULL.
126 (2007).
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Last but not least, One.Tel, an Australian telecommunications company,
went into liquidation in May 2001.65 One.Tel apparently suffered similar
industry problems as seen during the same period in the U.S. and
Europe. 66 As industry pressures created cash problems, One.Tel
engaged in insolvent trading, insider trading, and market disclosure
failures.67 In addition, at a time when One.Tel experienced A$290
million in losses, its executives received bonuses of A$7 million.68 At
the time of its collapse, One.Tel had approximately A$600 million in
liabilities.69
These scandals were remarkable on many levels, including their
simultaneous occurrence, how they manifested worldwide, the extent of
their fraud, and how they reflect an apparent lack of concern for
governance. Unfortunately, these scandals also shared a common
outcome—severe damage to investor confidence.70
III. COMPARATIVE REGULATION
A. The United States
On July 30, 2002, President Bush signed into law the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002,71 declaring, “[n]o more easy money for corporate criminals;
just hard time.”72 The bill raced through Congress. Sarbanes-Oxley
criminalized certain behaviors that had not previously been criminal and

65. See Brian R. Cheffins & Bernard S. Black, Outside Director Liability across
Countries, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1385, 1440 (2006) (discussing the prosecutions which arose
from this collapse). See also Michael De Martinis, Do Directors, Regulators, and
Auditors Speak, Hear, and See No Evil? Evidence from the Enron, HIH, and One.Tel
Collapses, 15 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 66 (2002).
66. Buchanan, supra note 47.
67. Leung & Cooper, supra note 62.
68. Id.
69. Buchanan, supra note 47. See also ASIC v. Rich (2003) 174 F.L.R. 128; Tanya
Josev, Tailoring Directors’ Duties to ‘Contemporary Community Expectations’: New
Directions for the Courts Post-ASIC v Rich, 22 CORP. & SEC. L.J. 553 (2004).
70. Jerry Knight, No Market Rebound Until Companies Come Clean, WASH. POST,
June 17, 2002, at E1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wpdyn?page
name=article&node=&contentId=A61568-2002Jun16&notFound=true (stating the damage is
demonstrated by the fact that “the economy has grown less than 3 percent in the past year, its
most anemic expansion in four decades”).
71. SOX, supra note 2.
72. President Bush Signs Corporate Corruption Bill, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1319–22 (July
30, 2002).
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significantly increased the penalties for existing crimes.73 The statute
imposes additional requirements that were intended to increase corporate
compliance with legal and ethical standards. 74 It also requires issuers of
securities to disclose in periodic reports whether they have adopted a
code of ethics for senior financial officers, and if not, to explain why.75
According to the Act, any amendments and waivers to the company’s
code of ethics must be immediately disclosed in a public filing.76
In addition, the Act directs national securities exchanges to prohibit
the listing of company securities where the audit committee has not
established procedures for the receipt, retention, and treatment of
complaints regarding accounting, internal accounting controls, or auditing
matters.77 In adopting the regulations, the SEC made clear that it was
not mandating specific requirements for reporting procedures, but companies
were instead being provided with the flexibility to develop procedures
appropriate to their circumstances.78
The statute responds directly to the multitude of scandals by including
provisions to criminalize specific wrongdoings, as well as vastly increasing
penalties to deter future corporate misconduct. It creates personal
accountability for the corporations’ directors and officers with almost no
forgiveness for failures to be accurate and transparent. Overall,
the Act’s provisions, in concert with mandates to regulators, strive to
restore the integrity of the marketplace.
B. Australia
The reform of Australian corporation law has been a work in progress
over the last two decades. 79 However, major corporate collapses in
Australia of HIH, Harris-Scarfe, and One.Tel resulted in legislative
proposals for corporate governance standards.80 In Australia, SarbanesOxley has, to a degree, also served as a model for change.81

73. Paul Fiorelli, Will U.S. Sentencing Commission Amendments Encourage a New
Ethical Culture Within Organizations?, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 565, 572–73 (2004).
74. See Rebecca Walker, The Evolution of the Law of Corporate Compliance in
the United States: A Brief Overview, in ADVANCED CORPORATE COMPLIANCE WORKSHOP
2007 ch. 1, 43–44 (2007).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Tomasic, supra note 3.
80. von Nessen, supra note 47.
81. Id.
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After the quick passage of SOX, the Chairman of the Australian
Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) proposed that the Australian
Stock Exchange (ASX) impose more rigorous corporate governance
standards.82 In response, the ASX introduced a set of guidelines, the ASX
Corporate Governance Council Principles of Good Corporate Governance
and Best Practice Recommendations.83 The ASX Principles provide a
comprehensive guide to best corporate governance practice, including
several initiatives similar in substance to those introduced by SOX.84
Further, a lack of audit independence and inaccurate reporting contributed
to the financial collapses in Australia.85 Much like the United States,
Australia responded by passing reforms entitled, “Corporate Law Economic
Reform Program (Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Act 2004
(CLERP 9).”86 CLERP 9 aims to rebuild the integrity of the audit system
by emphasizing and assuring auditor independence.87
C. Comparisons Between Australian and American
Corporate Governance Reform
Despite some notable differences between the United States and
Australian reforms, they are substantially similar regarding both the
underlying motivations for enactment and the goals that the regulations
are intended to meet.
While the overall goals of transparency, accountability and accuracy
are the same, the implementation is somewhat different. The United
States has channeled all of its reforms into Sarbanes-Oxley. There is no

82. Id.
83. ASX Corporate Governance Council, Corporate Governance Principles and
Recommendations (2d ed.), Aug. 2007, http://asx.ice4.interactiveinvestor.com.au/ASX0701/
Corporate%20Governance%20Principles/EN/body.aspx?z=1&p=-1&v=1&uid= [hereinafter
ASX Recommendations]; see also Hill, supra note 47, at 378.
84. von Nessen, supra note 47.
85. Id.
86. Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and Corporate
Disclosure) Act 2004, No. 103 (2004), available at http://www.comlaw.gov.au/ComLaw/
Legislation/Act1.nsf/0/66B0C93ECDA86C21CA256F720011722E?OpenDocum
ent [hereinafter CLERP 9].
87. Id.; see also Chapple & Koh, supra note 4, at 6 (2007). The Australian
proposals, like those in the United States, identify risks to independence caused by an
audit firm’s performance of non-audit functions and by the hiring by the firm of former
auditors. As in the United States, mechanisms to safeguard auditor independence include an
independent audit committee and rotation of audit staff.
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single statute like SOX that regulates corporate governance issues in
Australia. Instead, Australia retained a disclosure model with some
legislative requirements found in CLERP 9,88 supplemented by exchange
listing rules89 that implement corporate governance principles.90 The
ASX Principles adopt a “comply or explain” model, whereby companies
listed on the ASX must comply with, or explain their divergence from,
these principles in their annual report.91 If the ASX is not satisfied with
an explanation, or believes a flagrant breach occurred, they will refer the
matter to the ASIC.92 Thus, the U.S. has put most of its corporate reform
eggs in one legislative basket with some assistance from regulatory and
exchange listing standards. Australia, on the other hand, has some eggs
in the legislative basket, but placed many more in the baskets of
regulators and exchanges.
Implementation aside, the substance of the regulations bears substantial
similarities. Both countries’ new corporate governance regimes contain
reforms relating to director independence, board committees, executive
compensation, internal controls and ethics, disclosure, related
party transactions, enforcement, and auditor independence, though the
intricacies of those reforms are not always congruous.93 Just as SOX
directly responded to specific issues relating to the collapse of Enron and
other companies, CLERP 9 bears many hallmarks of the HIH collapse
and other scandals.94
1. Boards, Committees, and Directors
Given the Board of Director’s role as the body that ultimately oversees
the company, several of the reforms in Australia and the United States
have focused on how the board functions. Specifically, the reforms have
addressed the makeup of the entire board, the audit committee, and the
compensation committee. In the United States, the listing requirements
of the major stock exchanges, NYSE and NASDAQ, require that a
majority of the board be made up of independent directors.95 The listing
88. CLERP 9, supra note 86.
89. ASX, Listing Rules, http://www.asx.com.au/supervision/rules_guidance/listing_
rules1.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2010).
90. ASX Recommendations, supra note 83.
91. See Hill supra note 47, at 378.
92. Id.; see also Corporations Act, 2001, § 777 (Austl.).
93. See infra pt. II.C.(i)–(vii).
94. Hill, supra note 47, at 373 (2005).
95. NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 303A.01 (2009), available at
http://www.nyse.com/Frameset.html?nyseref=http%3A//www.nyse.com/regulation/listed
/1182508124422.html&displayPage=/lcm/lcm_section.html [hereinafter NYSE Manual];
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requirements also define independence with great detail.96 At a
minimum, a director is not independent if she is, or, within the last three
years, has been, an executive officer or employee of the company.
Additionally, the individuals may not have any material relationship
with the corporation. This includes both commercial and professional
relationships. A director is not independent if an immediate family member
falls into any of the described circumstances. The listing rules also contain
detailed requirements relating to interlocking board memberships.
Similarly, the Australian Securities Exchange recommends that a majority
of the board be made up of independent directors.97 As explained above,
Australia, like the UK, has adopted the lighter touch regulatory model
(“comply or explain”) rather than the direct legislative requirement
model adopted by SOX. This might in part be due to the smaller pool of
qualified accountants and experienced directors in a country of only 20
million (acknowledging the difficulties with complying with a totally
inflexible requirement), but may also be due to Australia’s historic
willingness to look to the UK for guidance in law reform. According to
the ASX Principles, a board must identify directors it considers independent.
The board should also provide the reasons it considers the individual
independent “notwithstanding the existence of relationships listed in Box
2.1.” These circumstances, which define “independence” for the purposes
of the ASX Principles, are substantially similar to the approach taken by
the NASDAQ and NYSE. Like the NYSE and NASDAQ requirements,
the ASX Principles note that family ties and interlocking board
memberships may impact independence and should be disclosed.
Because many of the scandals that produced Sarbanes-Oxley involved
accounting malfeasance, audit committees were prime candidates for
reform. One of the primary reforms to affect the operation of boards of
directors is Rule 10a-3, promulgated by the SEC under the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934. Rule 10a-3 mandates each national securities
exchange to implement initial and continuing listing requirements that
contain the provisions of the rule. Primarily, Rule 10a-3 provides that
the audit committee be made up of at least three members and that all

NASDAQ, Inc., Listing Rules, § 5605(b) (1), available at http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/
NASDAQ/Main/ [hereinafter NASDAQ Rules].
96. NYSE Manual, supra note 95, § 303A.02; NASDAQ Rules, supra note 95,
§ 5605(a) (2).
97. ASX Recommendations, supra note 83, at recommendation 2.1.
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members of the committee be independent directors. The rule also
requires audit committees to be responsible for supervising the work of
the registered public accounting firm and to establish a procedure for
complaints relating to accounting or auditing matters. Finally, audit
committees must have authority to engage independent counsel, advisers,
and funding to carry out its duties. An additional requirement is SOX
§ 407, which requires at least one person to be a financial expert.
The ASX Principles recommend that a board establish an audit
committee. 98 Unlike the approach taken in the United States, the
Principles only recommend that the audit committee consist of a majority of
independent directors, rather than entirely of independent directors.
However, the Principles do note that the trend is for the audit committee
to consist only of independent directors. Under the ASX Principles, the
scope of the audit committee’s responsibilities is similar to the framework
established by Sarbanes-Oxley Rule 10a-3. The audit committee must
“review the integrity of the company’s financial reporting and oversee
the independence of the external auditors”99 and be “given the necessary
power and resources to meet its charter.”100 Like § 407 of SarbanesOxley, the ASX Principles also recommend that the audit committee
include members who are “financially literate”101 and that at least one
member have “relevant qualifications and experience.”102 Furthermore, the
ASX Principles recommend the company disclose the names and
qualifications of members of the audit committee. Although the ASX
Principles merely offer recommendations about the makeup of an audit
committee, ASX Listing Rules specifically require the top 300 companies
in the S&P All Ordinaries Index103 to have audit committees.104
The roles of Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board have
also received a great deal of attention. Many commentators have suggested
these positions be split between two individuals.105 There is no law or
listing requirement in the United States that requires the Chairman of the
Board to be separate from the CEO. However, some firms have identified
98. Id. at Recommendation 4.1.
99. ASX Recommendations, supra note 83, at Recommendation 4.3,
Official Commentary.
100. Id.
101. Id. at Recommendation 4.2, Official Commentary.
102. Id.
103. The S&P All Ordinaries Index represents the 500 largest companies in the
Australian equities market and is published by Standard and Poor’s, a financial market
information firm.
104. ASX Recommendation, supra note 83, at Recommendation 4.1.
105. Joann S. Lublin, Splitting Posts of Chairman, CEO Catches On, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 11, 2002, at B1.
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a “lead independent director” in an effort to demonstrate strong corporate
governance.106 In contrast, ASX Principles suggest that the Chair should
be an independent director.107
2. Executive Compensation
Given the enormous rise in compensation for senior executives in
recent years, executive pay has received special scrutiny. In particular,
complex compensation packages based on stock option awards have
caught the eye of regulators. Much of the scrutiny focused on executives
who were especially cozy with their boards on matters of compensation.
As a result, both the NYSE and the NASDAQ established listing
requirements that require companies to have a compensation committee
composed entirely of independent directors.108 Similarly, ASX Principles
recommend a board establish a Remuneration Committee that consists of
a majority of independent directors and is chaired by an independent
director. In addition to the requirements for independence, companies in
both the United States and Australia must disclose certain information
regarding the compensation of senior executives. In the United States,
the SEC has promulgated rules that require companies to disclose
significant information about executive pay through a Compensation
Discussion and Analysis item in their annual report.109 In addition to
basic information about the amount of compensation, this item also
requires companies to include a narrative, in “plain English,” that
explains the compensation package and examines the factors that underlie
each compensation decision. Similarly, the Australian Corporations Act
requires substantial disclosure in a remuneration report about the
compensation for a company’s senior executives,110 which also must be
open for discussion by members at the annual general meeting.111 and
put to a non-binding vote of shareholders.112 Like the SEC approach, the
106. See, e.g., Washington Mutual, Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) (Apr. 4,
2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/933136/000127727708000173/
april42008.htm.
107. ASX Recommendations, supra note 83, at Recommendation 2.2.
108. NYSE Manual, supra note 95, § 303A.
109. Securities & Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2009) [hereinafter
SEC Act].
110. Corporations Act, 2001, § 300A (Austl.).
111. Id. § 250SA.
112. Id. § 250R.
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Australian approach requires companies to disclose the policy for
determining compensation and the relationship between such policy and
the company’s performance.113
In addition to shareholder consideration of the remuneration report,
Australian shareholders are also required to approve termination or
retirement payments for directors and managers.114 Approval, however,
is not required where the payments are within permissible limits based
upon a statutory formula that factors in the annual remuneration and
length of service of the director or manager.115 As a result of a number
of high profile departure packages paid subsequent to the global
financial crisis,116 the Australian government has recently proposed that
the statutory formula be tightened significantly. The proposal would
require shareholder approval where the departure payments exceed one
year’s annual salary (previously a long-serving manager or director
could receive up to seven years annual salary without approval), and
approval would be required to be given at a general meeting only after
the manager/director had departed.117
3. Internal Control and Ethics
One common thread among the string of corporate scandals is the lack
of ethical principles pertaining to internal governance, particularly with
regard to accounting. In response, reform has focused on preventative
mechanisms to ensure that proper internal controls are in place.
Most significantly, in the United States, management must annually
file a report assessing the reliability of the company’s internal financial
controls, and independent auditors must attest to that report.118 The
substantial costs of complying with this provision immediately triggered
heated debate and widespread criticism.119 Perhaps for that reason,

113. Id. § 300A (1).
114. Id. §§ 200A, 200B.
115. Id. § 200F.
116. See, e.g., Gerard McManus, Sol Trujillo leaves Telstra with a cool $20m, HERALD
SUN, Feb. 27, 2009, http://www.news.com.au/heraldsun/story/0,21985,25113002-664,00.html.
117. See Exposure Draft of the Corporations Amendment (Improving Accountability on
Termination Payments) Bill 2009, http://www.treasury.gov.au/documents/1531/PDF/
Termination_Bill_Exposure_Draft.pdf.
118. SOX, supra note 2, § 404.
119. Compare Robert Prentice, Sarbanes-Oxley: The Evidence Regarding the
Impact of SOX 404, 29 C ARDOZO L. R EV . 703 (2007) (arguing that the costs of
compliance with SOX 404 are overstated and outweighed by the increased accuracy in
financial reporting that has resulted), with Joseph A. Grundfest & Steven E. Bochner,
Fixing 404, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1643, 1673 (2007) (arguing that the “marginal costs of
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Australia refrained from instituting such a demanding requirement. The
ASX Principles simply require that companies establish a sound system
of risk oversight, management, and internal control, or disclose their
reason for declining to do so.120 At the time SOX was enacted, the amount
of compliance costs was only speculative. But now, several years later,
and with the benefit of hindsight, the cost-benefit analysis may be
empirically tested. Perhaps surprisingly, commentators are increasingly
opining that the costs of § 404 compliance are outweighed by the benefits;
that is, the initial criticism of § 404 may have been overstated.121 Thus,
Australia may have declined to require audits of internal controls
because of a knee-jerk reaction to a reform that has ultimately proved to
be worthwhile.
In a far less controversial measure, both the United States and
Australia have encouraged the creation and implementation of internal
ethics codes. In a deviation from the norm, the United States incorporated
the Australian disclosure-based approach and requires that public
companies disclose whether or not they have adopted a code of ethics for
senior financial officers, including the controller.122 While the ASX
requires the Code itself, SOX does not compel action by a public company
in this instance. The ASX does. Similarly, under the ASX Principles,
Australian boards should institute a code of conduct to guide the
directors, key executives, and employees as to the “practices necessary
to maintain confidence in the company’s integrity.”123 In addition, the
ethics code should address the “responsibility and accountability of

compliance far exceed the marginal benefits, causing the waste of billions of dollars on
inefficient implementation of Section 404 controls”).
120. ASX Recommendations, supra note 83, at Recommendation 7.1.
121. See, e.g., Prentice, supra note 119, at 726–32 (arguing that compliance costs
are overstated). Much of the remaining criticism revolves around the disproportionately
high compliance costs for small businesses and whether those businesses should be
exempt from § 404. See, e.g., Robert P. Bartlett III, Symposium, Going Private but Staying
Public: Reexamining the Effect of Sarbanes-Oxley on Firms’ Going-Private Decisions,
76 U. CHI. L. REV. 7 (2009) (arguing that smaller businesses are more likely to fund their
going private transactions with financing that does not trigger § 404 compliance); Ehud
Kamar, et al., Going-Private Decisions and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: A CrossCountry Analysis, 25 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 107, 129–30 (2009) (concluding based on an
empirical analysis that § 404 “disproportionately burdens small firms”).
122. SOX, supra note 2, § 406; NYSE Manual, supra note 95, § 303A.10.
123. ASX Recommendations, supra note 83, at Recommendation 3.1.
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individuals for reporting and investigating reports and unethical
practices.”124
4. Disclosure: Accounting, Continuous Disclosure,
and Officers’ Certificates
Issuers, both Australian and American, have long been required to
periodically prepare and file financial statements (quarterly in the United
States and semi-annually in Australia).125 Recent developments, however,
have significantly affected the required contents of those financial
statements. Differences have emerged regarding accounting rules governing
certain situations: an officer’s responsibility for the contents of the
financial statements, and the responsibility to continuously disclose
certain developments.
First, Australia and the United States have adopted different sets of
accounting standards, which have responded differently to the accounting
scandals. Currently, companies registered with the SEC must comply
with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (U.S. GAAP), promulgated
by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB).126 In 2003,
Australia joined a growing number of countries that subscribe to the
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), promulgated by the
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB).127 Compared to U.S.
GAAP, IFRS is relatively young and, perhaps consequently, represents a
more principles-based approach with fewer specific rules addressing
narrower issues.128
There are several differences between U.S. GAAP and IFRS, including,
for instance, the treatment of off-balance sheet transactions—the primary
124. Id.
125. See ASX Listing Rules, supra note 89, §§ 4.1–4.2C (semi-annually).
126. See Statement of Policy on the Establishment and Improvement of Accounting
Principles and Standards, Accounting Series Release No. 150 (Dec. 20, 1973) (SEC
concluding private sector would most effectively set accounting standards); Commission
Statement of Policy Reaffirming the Status of the FASB as a Designated Private-Sector
Standard Setter, Securities Act Release No. 33-8221, 80 SEC Docket 175, (May 27,
2003) (reaffirming FASB as delegate in light of Sarbanes-Oxley).
127. See IASB and the IASC Foundation, Who We Are and What We Do, http://www.
iasb.org/Use+around+the+world/Use+around+the+world.htm (listing when all its members,
including Australia, adopted IFRS).
128. The IASB was preceded by the International Accounting Standards Commission
(IASC), which was founded in 1973. Stephen A. Zeff, U.S. GAAP Confronts the IASB:
Roles of the SEC and the European Commission, N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 879, 879
(2003). But, until 2001, its founding countries, including the United States, continued to
support their own standard-setting bodies, largely ignoring the IASC. Id. at 880. In
2001, the IASB, which was adequately funded and comprised of independent experts,
issued its first widely-accepted standard. Id. at 885.
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mechanism through which Enron perpetuated its fraud.129 IFRS, with a
broad brush, effectively prohibits all off-balance sheet transactions, but
U.S. GAAP permits off-balance sheet transactions if certain
specific rules are satisfied.130 In this area, U.S. GAAP allows for aggressive
issuers, such as Enron, to structure transactions so that off-balance sheet
treatment is appropriate (formalistically), even thought off-balance sheet
treatment may be substantively inappropriate.131 SOX now requires
disclosure of all off-balance sheet transactions, but they are still not
prohibited.132
At the request of the SEC, since 1988, the FASB and the IASB have
been implementing a “best efforts” approach to convergence on a topicby-topic basis.133 The process has gained momentum, following the SEC’s
announcement in March 2008 that foreign private issuers in the United
States could comply with IFRS without reconciling to U.S. GAAP.134
At least regarding off-balance sheet transactions, the Enron scandal is
likely to affect the convergence of FASB and IASB standards.135
Dissatisfied with executives’ attempts to disclaim knowledge of the
inner-workings of their financial statements, both countries now require
129. See Kurt Eichenwald & Michael Brick, Deals that Helped Doom Enron Began
to Form in the Early 90’s, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2002, at A1.
130. See John M. Holcomb, Corporate Governance: Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Related
Legal Issues, and Global Comparisons, 32 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 175, 226 (2004)
(citing F. Robert Buchanan, International Accounting Harmonization: Developing a
Single World Standard, 46 BUS. HORIZONS 3 (2003)).
131. See McDermott Will & Emery, SEC Proposes Roadmap for U.S. Issuers to
Switch to IFRS, (Nov. 25, 2008), available at http://www.mwe.com/info/news/wp1108b.pdf
(interpreting the differences between IFRS and U.S. GAAP regarding off-balance sheet
transactions); Luzi Hall, Christian Leuz & Peter Wysocki, Global Accounting Convergence
and the Potential Adoption of IFRS by the United States: An Analysis of Economic and
Policy Factors at 35 (Feb. 2009) (reprinted in a letter by the Financial Accounting
Foundation, which oversees the FASB to the SEC, dated Mar. 11, 2009, available at
http://fasb.org/FAF_SEC_Roadmap_Response_Final_with_Appendix.pdf) (explaining how
bright line rules regarding off-balance sheet transactions could lead to abuse).
132. SOX, supra note 2, § 404.
133. See Regulation of the International Securities Markets, Securities Act Release
No. 33-6807, 42 SEC Docket 284 (Nov. 30, 1988).
134. See Acceptance from Foreign Private Issuers of Financial Statements Prepared
in Accordance with International Reporting Standards Without Reconciliation to U.S.
GAAP, Securities & Exchange Acts Release Nos. 33-8879; 34-57026, 92 SEC Docket
825 (Jan. 22, 2008), available at http://sec.gov/rules/final/2007/33-8879.pdf.
135. See Hall, Leuz & Wysocki, supra note 131, at 35. For a discussion of the other
differences between U.S. GAAP and IFRS, which are less relevant to the specific accounting
scandals preceding SOX, see id. at 52–54 (fair value accounting, revenue recognition,
share-based payments, financial liabilities and equity, and consolidations).
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certain officers to certify, to some degree, the accuracy of the financial
statements. In the United States, CFOs and CEOs must certify that financial
reports “fairly present” their company’s financial position and do not
contain any untrue statement or omission of any material fact necessary
to make other statements made not misleading.136 Similarly, under the
Australian Corporations Act, CFOs and CEOs of listed entities must
certify to the board that the financial statements present a “true and fair”
view of the company’s financial position.137
Last, both countries have instituted new requirements regarding the
continuing obligation to disclose certain information or events that may
be material to investors. In the United States, each reporting public
company must disclose to the public on a “rapid and current basis” any
material information concerning changes in its financial condition which
is “necessary or useful for the protection of investors and is in the public
interest.” 138 Likewise, in Australia, a disclosure must be made if a
reasonable person would expect the information to have an effect on the
price of the security. 139 But, in a deviation from American law,
Australian law dictates that the amount of time within which the
company must disclose the information depends on the size of the
company. Certain unlisted public companies must disclose the information
“as soon as practical,” but all others must make the disclosure
“immediately.”140
5. Related Party Transactions
Loans to corporate executives were at the center of many of the
corporate scandals that precipitated Sarbanes-Oxley. Many executives
exercised stock options and accumulated large equity positions with
cheap loans from their companies. As a result, there is a general
prohibition on personal loans from a public company to directors and
executives of that company. 141 However, this ban is subject to
some exceptions. Neither the ASX Listing Principles nor the Australian
136. SOX, supra note 2, §§ 302, 906.
137. Corporations Act, 2001, § 295A (Austl.).
138. SOX, supra note 2, § 409.
139. ASX Listing Rules, supra note 89, § 3.1; Corporations Act, 2001, pt. 6CA,
§ 674(2) (Austl.).
140. ASX Listing Rules, supra note 89, § 3.1. A delay of 72 minutes in the release
of information concerning acquisition negotiations by Rio Tinto Ltd. resulted in
a $100,000 infringement. ASIC Media Release 08-117, Rio Tinto Complies with ASC
Infringement Notice, (June 5, 2008),http://www.asx.com.au/supervision/pdf/asic_media_
release_08_117_ rio_tinto.pdf.
141. SOX, supra note 2, § 402.
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Corporations Act contains an outright prohibition on loans to public
company directors or executives. Yet, the Australian Corporations Act
requires public companies to obtain member approval for loans to related
parties.142 This prohibition is also subject to a number of exceptions.
6. Enforcement
The SEC has a variety of tools available to enforce the provisions of
the federal securities laws which relate to corporate governance.
Perhaps the most fundamental tool is the general prohibition on fraud in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities, embodied in Rule
10b-5. Because Rule 10b-5 prohibits material misrepresentations in
SEC filings and statements made to the public, it acts as a strong curb on
corporate malfeasance. The SEC may seek civil penalties for violations
of Rule 10b-5 and other securities laws. Sarbanes-Oxley also broadened
the availability of and sentencing guidelines for criminal penalties for
violating securities laws.143 It increased the maximum prison sentence
for falsifying or destroying audit records to ten years.144 Additionally,
the implied private right of action associated with Rule 10b-5 augments
the use of the tool by the SEC or the Department of Justice.
The SEC also has available tools that are tailored to executive
compensation, sales of company stock, and service on a board of
directors. New regulations have targeted executives that receive lucrative
compensation packages based on improper or fraudulent financial reports.
Specifically, CEOs and CFOs must forfeit any bonuses and profits
received from the sale of company securities during the twelve month
period following the filing of a financial report for which an accounting
restatement was required due to accounting or reporting misconduct.145
Finally, the SEC may prohibit any person from serving as an officer or
director if they have violated certain anti-fraud provisions and their
conduct demonstrates “unfitness” to serve.146
The Australian enforcement scheme also provides for disqualification
from board membership and civil penalties. A person can be disqualified
142. Corporations Act, 2001, ch. 2E (Austl.).
143. SOX, supra note 2, §§ 802 (criminal penalties for altering documents), 805
(sentencing guidelines), 807 (criminal penalties for defrauding shareholders).
144. SOX, supra note 2, § 802.
145. SOX, supra note 2, § 402.
146. SEC Act, supra note 109, § 240.10(b).
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under the Corporations Act from managing corporations for convictions
for certain serious offenses; for involvement in failed corporations; for
awaiting discharge in bankruptcy; and for repeated contraventions of the
Corporations Act.147 The civil penalty provisions of the Corporations
Act now provide a maximum civil penalty for corporate offenders of up
to $1 million (up from the previous $200,000). Compensation for losses
may also be provided.148
7. Auditing Functions and Auditing Independence
As the wave of accounting scandals rolled past the millennium, with
building agitation, legislators and investors looked to the independent
auditors—the “public watchdogs”149—for an explanation of how these
frauds remained undetected. The regulation that resulted from these
inquiries reveals the perception that auditors have failed to maintain their
independence from their clients. Consequently, both Australia and the
United States have assumed a greater role of supervision over the audit
profession and have attempted to remove, or at least diminish, several
frequently occurring situations perceived as likely to undermine an
auditor’s independence.
i. Heightened Supervision of the Audit Profession
Both Australia and the United States concluded that it was no longer
appropriate for the auditing profession to remain fully self-regulating.
Sarbanes-Oxley created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(PCAOB), a five-member board partially independent of the accounting
profession, and overseen by the SEC, to set auditing, quality, control,
and independence standards.150 Instead of creating a new regulating entity,
Australia, in CLERP 9, expanded the responsibilities of the Financial
Reporting Council to oversee the setting of auditing standards, advise
and monitor auditor independence, promote the teaching of professional
and business ethics, and monitor the adequacy of disciplinary procedures.151

147. Corporations Act, 2001, pt. 2D.6 (Austl.).
148. Corporations Act, 2001, pt. 9.4, § 1317G (B1) (Austl.).
149. See United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 818 (1984) (characterizing
auditors as “public watchdogs”).
150. SOX, supra note 2, § 101. Only two members of the board may be certified
public accountants. Id. at (e) (2).
151. Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act, 2001, pt. 12, div. 3,
subdiv. A (Austl.) [hereinafter ASIC Act].
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Despite the differing approaches, however, both countries are clearly
taking a more proactive role in overseeing the auditing profession.
ii. Potential Conflicting Interests
The accounting scandals revealed that auditors had repeatedly failed to
maintain independence from their clients. In investigating the cause,
several characteristics of the auditor-client relationship were illuminated
as potential sources of conflicting interests. Authorities, both in the
United States and Australia, tailored regulations to specifically address the
problematic areas.
For instance, the external auditor is charged with the responsibility of
maintaining independence from its client, but the client hires and fires
the auditor and pays the audit fees. The conflicting interests inherent in
such a relationship potentially enable the client to improperly influence
its auditor. While both Australian and American law address this issue,
Sarbanes-Oxley does so more specifically. In the United States, an
officer or director of a public company is prohibited from fraudulently
influencing or coercing any independent, public auditor that is
performing an audit on the company.152 In Australia, general principles,
rather than specific rules, govern the improper influence of auditors.
Since 2004, the Corporations Act provides that there should be auditor
independence; that auditors are required to annually declare to the board
that the auditor has maintained its independence; that financial
relationships between the auditor and the audit client are restricted; and
that Professional Standards on Independence are applied, requiring the
auditor to identify threats to independence and safeguards to be
employed.153
In a more recent development, during the 1990s, public accounting
firms began deriving increasingly substantial proportions of their
revenue from non-auditing services, particularly consulting services.154

152. SOX, supra note 2, § 303; SEC Act, supra note 109, §§ 240.13b2-2 (b) (1), (b)
(2), (2) (c).
153. Corporations Act, 2001, §§ 307A–C, 300(11B), 307C (Austl.).
154. See Dep’t of the Treasury, Final Report of the Advisory Comm. on the Auditing
Profession, in SEC SPEAKS IN 2009 693, 704 (2009) (committee co-chaired by Arthur
Levitt., Jr., and Donald T. Nicolaisen) (“Pre-Sarbanes-Oxley, audit fees were on
average approximately only 50% of total fees charged to audit clients. That percentage
increased dramatically to approximately 80% by 2006.”).
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Under such a compensation structure, the client boasts greater leverage
when negotiating disputes with its auditors because the accounting firm
stands to lose not only its audit revenue, but also its more lucrative
consulting revenue. Likely to compromise auditor independence, this
situation was ripe for reform. The United States, compared to Australia,
took a more hard-line approach. Sarbanes-Oxley prohibits independent
auditors from performing non-auditing services, such as consulting
contemporaneously with an audit, unless the non-audit services amount
to less than 5% of the total annual fees.155 The act exempts a few types
of services, all of which require pre-approval by the audit committee.156
In Australia, the Professional Standards on Independence, since 2004,
require the auditor to identify threats to independence, as well as any
appropriate safeguards to be employed. In some situations, Australian
companies must disclose that they are performing non-audit services and
explain why those services do not compromise its independence.157
Not only are auditors limited in the type of services that may be
provided, but new regulations also restrict who may provide those
services. Today, an audited company may be so large that its audit
requires the full-time attention of a partner at an audit firm. Recognizing
the risk that a partner may become subservient to such a client and
tempted to sacrifice ethics to retain the company as a client, both
Australia and the United States now require “rotation” of the auditor
(within the same accounting firm) every five years.158 The only major
difference between the two laws is that in the United States, only the
audit partner must rotate, 159 but in Australia, all auditors with a
“significant role in the audit” must rotate.160
Likewise, both Australian and American legislatures recognize the
potential conflicting interests that arise when employees of an
independent auditor become employees of its client, or vice-versa. To
limit the effects of intertwined staffs, Sarbanes-Oxley prohibits an
accounting firm from auditing a public company if a senior finance
executive of the client was employed by the accounting firm and that
person participated in the audit of the company during the preceding
year.161 Similarly, in Australia, since 2004, a professional member of an

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

390

SOX, supra note 2, § 208.
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Corporations Act, 2001, §§ 324 CA–324 CH (Austl.).
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audit firm is prohibited from becoming a director or other responsible
officer of an audited company within two years from departing the audit
firm.162
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS LIABILITY
INSURANCE IN THE U.S. AND AUSTRALIA
A. United States
Directors and Officers (D & O) liability insurance is a product that
emerged in the 1930s, shortly after the enactment of the Securities Act
of 1933 and Securities Act of 1934. 163 Publicly held corporations,
however, did not widely purchase this coverage in the United States until
the 1970s. At that time, judicial interpretation of liability under federal
securities laws brought increased exposure to directors, officers, and the
corporation itself.164 Today, almost all publicly held corporations hold
D & O policies.165
The market for D & O liability insurance historically has been a
cyclical one, with both “hard” and “soft” cycles.166 In a hard market,
underwriters become more selective, more interested in higher
attachment points, less willing to offer high limits, less willing to

162. Corporations Act, 2001, §§ 324 CI, 324 CJ (Austl.).
163. See M. Martin Boyer, Three Insights from the Canadian D & O Insurance
Market: Inertia, Information and Insiders, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 75, 77 (2008); Joseph P.
Monteleone, Directors’ and Officers Liability Insurance: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 and other Topical Issues, in ENRON, WORLDCOM, AND THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT
OF 2002: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE, AUDITING, AND OTHER
ISSUES 313, 315 (2002) [hereinafter Monteleone].
164. Monteleone, supra note 163.
165. See id.; Towers Perrin, Directors and Officers Liability Survey: 2006 Survey of
Insurance Purchasing and Claims Trends (2006) [hereinafter Perrin Survey],
http://www.towersperrin.com/tp/getwebcachedoc?webc=HRS/USA/2007/200704/DO_S
urvey_Report2006_040507.pdf; Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, Predicting Corporate
Governance Risk: Evidence from the Directors’ & Officers’ Liability Insurance Market,
74 U. CHI. L. REV. 487, n.2 (2007).
166. Gary Lockwood, D&O Insurance: The Cycle of Change, 16 PROF. LIABILITY
UNDERWRITING S OC ’ Y J., 1, 3 (Oct. 2003), available at http://www.lordbissell.com/
Newsstand/Lockwood-D&OInsurance-PLUS_10-2003.pdf; Tom Baker & Sean J.
Griffith, Predicting Corporate Governance Risk: Evidence from the Directors &
Officers' Liability Insurance Market, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 487, 507 (2007) (The D&O
insurance market went through this hard phase in the mid-1980s and again in 2001–
2003. More recently, the D&O insurance market has been shifting to the soft phase.)
(footnotes omitted).

391

GABEL (DO NOT DELETE)

5/5/2010 11:16 AM

negotiate contract terms, and able to command dramatically higher prices
for what amounts to less coverage.167 During the 1980s, the insurance
industry entered a hard cycle where premiums rose dramatically and it
was difficult for some corporations to secure D & O coverage.168 The
opposite occurs during a soft cycle, as was experienced during the
1990s, where insurers competed for business and broader coverage was
available at a better price.169

167. Baker & Griffith, supra note 165, at 507.
168. Lisa M. Fairfax, Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director? Revitalizing Directors’
Fiduciary Duty Through Legal Liability, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 393, 415 (2005); see Michael
D. Sousa, Making Sense of the Bramble-Filled Thicket: The “Insured vs. Insured”
Exclusion in the Bankruptcy Context, 23 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 365, 374–75 (2007)
(stating that the Van Gorkom decision caused insurance companies to become “skittish”
about issuing liability insurance coverage for a corporation’s directors and officers);
Jack. B. Jacobs, The Vanishing Substance-Procedure Distinction in Contemporary Corporate
Litigation: An Essay, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 8 (2007) (“Van Gorkom’s . . . impact was
to create a national directors and officers (D&O) liability insurance crisis. The insurance
industry reacted to the decision by raising the cost of D&O liability insurance to almost
prohibitive levels, and in some cases, stopped providing D&O insurance altogether.”);
Henry N. Butler, Smith v. Van Gorkom, Jurisdictional Competition, and the Role of
Random Mutations in the Evolution of Corporate Law, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 267, n.19
(2006) (“The initial effect of Van Gorkom was to increase directors and officers (D&O)
insurance rates or to make D&O insurance unavailable.”); William T. Allen, Jack B.
Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Function over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of Review
in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 BUS. LAW. 1287, n.49 (2001) (noting that after Van
Gorkom, the D&O insurance industry sharply increased their premiums, and in some
cases threatened to stop writing D&O insurance policies); see also Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); Lloyd L. Drury, III, What’s the Cost of a Free Pass?
A Call for the Re-Assessment of Statutes that Allow for the Elimination of Personal
Liability for Directors, 9 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 99, 105–07 (2007); Florence
Shu-Acquaye, Smith v. Van Gorkom Revisited: Lessons Learned in Light of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 3 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 19, 19 (2004). The 1985 case,
Smith v. Van Gorkom, was a landmark decision in the United States as it clarified the
requisites for a breach of the fiduciary duty of care. Van Gorkom involved the sale of
Trans Union Corporation. Jerome Van Gorkom, the CEO and a significant stockholder
of Trans Union, discussed selling the company with some of his fellow executives, but
only preliminarily. As part of these discussions, he received basic financial data on
financing the buyout. Using this information, Van Gorkom approached the potential
buyer who offered to purchase Trans Union. Van Gorkom called a meeting of the Trans
Union board on only two days notice. At the meeting, he gave an oral presentation but
did not provide financial analysis or any written documentation, and did not disclose the
circumstances of the negotiation process. The board asked very few follow-up questions
before approving the merger. The Delaware Supreme Court found that the board’s
actions violated the duty of care and that the board acted in a grossly negligent manner in
deciding to accept the offer. The court based its conclusion on the finding that he board
did not act on an informed basis when making its decision to proceed with the
acquisition. Before Van Gorkom, courts did not find directors personally liable absent a
conflict of interest. However, in Van Gorkom, the court found the directors liable based
solely on the breach of the duty of care.
169. Lockwood, supra note 167, at 3.
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The unprecedented number of highly publicized securities fraud class
action lawsuits and accounting scandals in the early twenty-first century
rocked the D & O insurance industry.170 The number of lawsuits naming
individual directors and officers increased dramatically, and damages,
settlements, and the costs of litigation and regulatory proceedings
soared.171 Sarbanes-Oxley brought about more risk by further exposing
directors and officers to liability.172 As a result, premiums increased
approximately 30% in 2001 and 30% in 2002.173 In 2003, premiums
increased 33%.174 Premiums for the largest companies, those with market
capitalizations of $5 billion or more, increased as much as 70% in
2004.175 In an attempt to quantify the costs of Sarbanes-Oxley, a survey
of mostly mid-cap companies found that the cost of being a public
company almost doubled, from $1.3 million to almost $2.5 million.176
Mid-cap companies generally have a market capitalization between $2
billion and $10 billion. The increased costs were attributed to the added
liability of the chief executive officer, who is required to personally sign
off on the company’s financial statement.177 According to the survey,
almost two-thirds of the increased expense was D & O liability insurance,

170. Anjali C. Das, The ABCs of D & O Insurance: An Illinois Lawyer’s Guide, 93
ILL. B.J. 304, 304 (2005); see also Fairfax, supra note 168, at 415; Kate Burgess,
Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance Demand and Cost Set to Rise: Kate Burgess Analyses
the Impact of Scandal, FIN. TIMES (Eng.), April 25, 2006, at 3; Randy Paar, Insurance
Coverage in the World of Sarbanes-Oxley, in PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE: COMMERCIAL
LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 217, 221 (2003) (Address before the
Practicing Law Institute: D&O Liability & Insurance in a Sarbanes-Oxley World (June 3,
2003)); Mairi Mallon, U.S. D & O Lulled into a False Sense of Security?, REINSURANCE
MAG., Nov. 1, 2006, at 20; Sousa, supra note 168, at 375 (noting an increase in premiums
after the Enron, Adelphia Communications, and Tyco scandals).
171. Securities Class Action Case Filings 2002: A Year in Review, available
at http://securities.stanford.edu/clearinghouse_research/2002_YIR/2002_yir_settlements.
pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 2010); ROBERT W. HAMILTON & JONATHAN R. MACEY, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED LIABILITY
COMPANIES 970 (9th ed. 2005).
172. Id.; see also Sousa, supra note 168, at 377–78.
173. JOHN F. OLSON ET AL., DIRECTOR & OFFICER LIABILITY: INDEMNIFICATION AND
INSURANCE § 4.26 (2007).
174. Id.
175. HAMILTON & MACEY, supra note 171, at 970. But see OLSON ET AL., supra
note 173, at § 4.26 (stating premiums decreased in 2004).
176. J. Brent Wilkins, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: The Ripple Effects of
Restoring Shareholder Confidence, 29 S. ILL. L.J. 339, 347 (2005).
177. See id.
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which averaged $329,000 prior to Sarbanes-Oxley and grew to $639,000
afterwards.178
As a result of Sarbanes-Oxley and increased shareholder litigation,
some of the largest commercial insurance companies reduced their D &
O coverage obligations by increasing deductibles and lowering limits on
overall coverage, thus exposing directors to increasing liability.179 As
insurer capacity deteriorated and insurers left the market, a large number
of new insurers emerged to offer D & O coverage to public companies.180
Because demand rose between 2000 and 2003, more insurers entered the
market, causing D & O premiums to fall.181 In addition, class actions
against U.S. listed companies declined, resulting in reduced premiums.182
In a matter of just a few years, a post-scandal, hard cycle quickly went
soft. Despite the current soft cycle, demand for protection remains
unabated.183
A 2006 Towers Perrin Directors and Officers Liability Survey reported a
continuing soft market for D & O insurance. 184 As a result, survey
participants generally reported higher limits, slightly lower retentions
and premiums, broader coverage, and fewer exclusions.185 Interest in an
organization’s D & O program by potential directors increased.186 In
2006, premiums decreased by 6.5%, and 31% of participants reported an
increase in coverage enhancements.187 In addition, over 99% of public
companies purchased D & O insurance.188
The Survey also reported an increased interest in Side A of D & O
insurance. Side A D & O insurance policies cover the individual directors
and officers when they are not indemnified by their organization.189 For
public companies, 38% reported purchasing such a policy.190

178. Id. at 348.
179. Fairfax, supra note 168, at 415.
180. See Mairi Mallon, supra note 170, at 20 (noting that Lloyd’s of London
virtually ceased providing D & O insurance to public companies).
181. See Burgess, supra note 170, at 3.
182. See id.
183. See id.
184. Perrin Survey, supra note 165 (The annual Towers Perrin D & O survey is based
on a nonrandom, self-selecting sample of companies. It is also the only systematic source of
information on D & O insurance purchasing patterns in the U.S.).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.; Baker & Griffith, supra note 165, at. 487, n. 2.
189. See Sousa, supra note 170, at 379-80. Specifically, “Side A” Coverage provides
liability coverage directly to the officers and directors of a corporation for claims asserted
against them for their wrongful acts, errors, omissions, or breaches of duty. A-Side Coverage
insures the corporate directors and officers in the event that the corporation does not or
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Additionally, the Survey provided the following data representing the
types of D & O allegations from shareholder claimants against public
companies: accounting fraud 2%; breach of duty to minority shareholders
4%; dishonestly/fraud 3%; general breach of fiduciary duty 12%;
inadequate disclosure including financial reporting 37%; and stock and
other public offering 19%.
B. Australia
Most Australian public companies purchase D & O insurance.191
Companies purchase D & O policies for the benefit of their directors and
officers.192 The company may pay the premium in full, or alternatively,
have an agreement where the covered individuals also contribute, thereby
giving the individuals privity of contract.193 Subsections 300(8) and (9)
of the Corporations Act require reporting entities who have paid all or
part of the premium costs to disclose that fact in their annual report.194
Under a D & O policy, a company may obtain insurance coverage
with respect to its directors and officers for any liability they may incur
for wrongful acts committed by them in the conduct of their duties.195
Although the definition of wrongful acts varies from insurer to insurer, a
typical definition includes any actual breach of duty, breach of trust,
neglect, error, misstatement, misleading statement, omission, or any

cannot indemnify them under any applicable corporate documents or laws. A-Side
Coverage is significant because it protects directors and officers where the corporation is
financially unable to indemnify due to insolvency or bankruptcy, or is legally unable to
indemnify due to prohibitions under state corporation law or the corporation’s own bylaws or articles of incorporation. Id. In contrast, “Side B” coverage provides reimbursement
to the corporation for amounts paid as indemnification to its directors and officers, and
“Side C” coverage, also known as entity coverage, protects the company itself against
various claims made directly against it. Marc H. Falladori, Stock Option Backdating—
Regulators and Plaintiffs Take the Controversy to the Next Level, in PREPARATION OF
ANNUAL DISCLOSURE DOCUMENTS ch. 16, 666 (2007).
190. Perrin Survey, supra note 165.
191. Cheffins & Black, supra note 65, at 1437.
192. See CORPORATIONS AND MARKET ADVISORY COMMITTEE, DIRECTORS AND
OFFICERS INSURANCE REPORT 6, June 2004, http://www.camac.gov.au/CAMAC/camac.nsf/0/
04A9BFD9B3915EA7CA256ED9000DE5AD/$file/D&O_Insurance_report_Jun2004.pdf
[hereinafter CMAC Report].
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. See id. at 6–7.
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liability asserted against them solely because of their status as directors
or officers of the company.196
Section 199B of the Corporations Act provides that D & O policies
cannot cover (other than for legal costs) any liability by the directors or
officers arising out of willful breach of duty in relation to the company;
improper use of position; or improper use of information.197 However, it
is common for Australian D & O policies to have standard exclusions
over and above § 199B including prospectus liability; professional
indemnity; insider trading; claims brought by shareholders; claims
arising from breaches of environmental or occupational health and safety
regulations; and claims alleging dishonesty or fraud.198
Similar to the market in the U.S., the Australian D & O market entered
a hard cycle after the HIH Casualty and General Insurance LTD collapse
and other financial scandals.199 Significant capital left the insurance market,
although sufficient competition remains in Australia amongst twelve to
fourteen Australia-based insurers.
Further, after the scandals earlier this decade, premiums increased
markedly.200 However, there was no hard and fast rule, as some insureds
incurred little increase, while others experienced increases in excess of
300%. Brokers and underwriters surveyed by Clayton Utz speculated
that organizations listed in the U.S. or Canada, or organizations with
operations and assets in the U.S. and Canada, have generally been the
most severely affected. Increases at the time ranged from 10% to 30%,
with London based insurers averaging a 20% to 50% increase. However,
the market has leveled off, as indicated by a general insurance survey
conducted by JP Morgan Deloitte, finding that D & O premiums fell 6%
in 2006.201

196. See id. at 7.
197. Id. at 7.
198. Id. at 7–8.
199. See Clayton Utz, Directors and Officers Insurance: Survey Findings, http://www.
strategicsolutions.com.au/Pages/documents/April%202003%20-%20D&OInsurance%20%20Market%20Survey%20conducted%20in%20collaboration%20with%20Clayton%20Utz.
pdf at 3. The financial scandals included self-dealing between HIH Insurance and an outside
director, insider trading by a non-executive director for Telstra, and three cases of out of
pocket liability arising from insufficient vigilance by outside directors involving Clifford
Corporation, One.Tel, and Water Wheel Holdings. Cheffins & Black, supra note 65, at
1441.
200. Utz, supra note 199, at 3; CMAC Report, supra note 192, at 3.
201. JP Morgan, 2006 General Insurance Industry Survey, at 5 (2006) http://www.
deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/JPMorgan_Deloitte_Survey_06_low_res(2).pdf; CMAC Report,
supra note 192, at 6.
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The Clayton Utz survey reported that insurers did not withdraw
coverage from 2002 to 2003. 202 However, during the hard cycle,
insurers underwrote more selectively, focused on pricing, and limited
conditions of coverage.203 Further, recent developments such as the ASX
Corporate Governance Guidelines and the extent of a company’s
compliance with these guidelines have the ability to impact an insurer’s
decision to provide coverage, as well as the terms and conditions of that
coverage.204
Despite these developments, for both Australia and the U.S., a soft
market exists that has loosened terms of coverage. For example, in
Australia, one can now obtain coverage for civil fines and penalties
where such coverage was not available previously.205 In the U.S., soft
markets have ultimately proved advantageous for directors seeking to
protect their personal assets and for those seeking to fill previous gaps in
coverage, such as non-rescindability.206 Also, in both countries, changes
to liability have pushed for improved coverage in order to lure desirable
candidates to serve on boards. Both countries cite difficulty, proving
that new liability has actually encouraged a potential candidate to decline a
position, but the fear remains.207
V. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
Both the United States and Australia have focused on a duty of care
and a climate of disclosure and trust in order to ensure a fair
marketplace. Despite these efforts, both countries experienced scandal
in the last decade and the credit crisis today, revealing gaps in corporate
regulation. Corporate collapses in Australia of HIH, Harris-Scarfe, and
202. Utz, supra note 199, at 3.
203. See CMAC Report, supra note 192, at 39.
204. See id.
205. Paul Stock, With Great Power . . . , RISK MAG., May 19, 2008, http://www.risk
managementmagazine.com.au/articles/49/0C056949.asp?Type=124&Category=1240.
206. See Stephen J. Weiss & Thomas H. Bentz, Jr., The D & O Insurance Market is
Soft: What You can do to Take Advantage of Changing Market Conditions, DIRECTORS &
BOARDS, (Sept. 22, 2007), http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0199-6900927/The-D-Oinsurance-market.html#abstract.
207. See Berna Collier, Current Corporate Governance Issues: An ASIC Perspective,
Sept. 19, 2003, available at http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/pdflib.nsf/LookupByFileName/nt_
bus&prof_women_corp_gov190903.pdf/$file/nt_bus&prof_women_corp_gov190903.pdf
(Berna Collier, Commissioner, ASIC, addressed the Northern Territory Chapter of the
Business & Professional Women’s Chapter and the ASIC Women’s Network).
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One.Tel, however, resulted in legislative reforms and stronger corporate
governance standards.208 Sarbanes-Oxley has similarly ushered in new
standards.209 As the impact of the credit crisis continues to emerge, new
corporate governance standards will likely experience their first real test.
Past and present scandals have also affected directors and officers
liability and the availability of coverage for such claims. Increased
shareholder class action lawsuits, high damage awards in those lawsuits,
and claims related to the restatement of earnings for both countries have
had strong impacts on carriers. Nonetheless, the D & O market has
softened faster than many would have expected, driving coverage for
claims up and the cost for coverage down for both countries. Such
similarities in the D & O marketplace have the potential positive
outcome of creating predictable, and similar, risk management practices
for companies operating in both markets—a silver lining perhaps.
Despite this similarity, there are key differences that may prevent a
true synergy and may impact regulatory response to the scandals that
have led to the recent economic downturn. First, there appears to be fear
in Australia that rampant liability will prevent top candidates from
taking directorships. There is speculation that this fear will drive
regulators to loosen the stronghold on directors and officers’ liability.
While this fear exists in the United States as well, it appears to be less
pronounced and will be less likely to serve as an impetus for minimizing
governance standards.
Second, there are distinctions between how liability is assigned in the
United States and Australia. The U.S. channels most of its corporate
reforms through Sarbanes-Oxley with regulators and exchanges playing
supporting roles. Australia, on the other hand, relies more heavily on
regulators and exchanges in addition to employing many no-fault
provisions that the United States does not. Also, Australian law
incorporates the business judgment rule into their code210 while the rule
remains largely entrenched in the common law of the United States. For
Australia, these factors combine with a soft D & O market to favor
directors and officers with regard to increased coverage and a push to
expand the business judgment rule so that some directors can delegate
208. See von Nessen, supra note 47.
209. See generally Tomasic, supra note 3; von Nessen, supra note 47.
210. In Australia, an officer or director’s decision is protected from interference by
a court if it is made in good faith for a proper purpose; the officer or director does not
have a material personal in the subject matter of the judgment; the officer or director informs
themselves about the subject matter of the judgment to the extent they reasonably believe
to be appropriate; and the officer or director rationally believe that the judgment is in the
best interests of the corporation. Corporations Act, 2001, § 180(2).
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more liability down to lower-level officers. The credit crisis may cause
the push to lessen, however.
In the United States, these factors seem to have created a more
traditional soft market response with D & O insurance—lower premiums
and increased access to coverage. Also, the market is responding by allowing
even better coverage for independent board members. Fundamental
changes in liability law, however, do not appear forthcoming. On
the contrary, a lack of successful prosecutions under Sarbanes-Oxley or
the resulting regulations seems, in and of itself, to have alleviated much
anxiety over the risk that directors and officers may bear. The current
credit crisis may revive that anxiety. Nonetheless, the shared process of
enduring scandal and reforming markets has, on the whole, brought
much commonality to the American and Australian governance model—
a positive for carriers and publicly traded companies worldwide who
operate in either or both markets.
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VI. APPENDIX A
The following chart summarizes the similarities and differences between
the reform in the United States and in Australia.211
Reform
United States
Regulation of Boards, Committees, and Directors
Director
Independent directors must
Independence
comprise a majority of the
board.212 An independent
director is a director who
has no material relationship,
commercial or professional,
with the corporation.
Prohibited relationships
include:
(1) former employment by
the company within three
years;
(2) former employment by
the company’s independent
auditor within three years;
(3) interlocking directorship
within three years with the
CEO on the compensation
committee; and
(4) any of the above
relationships if maintained
by any immediate family
member of the director.213

211.
note 47.
212.
213.
214.

400

Australia
Independent directors
should comprise a majority
of the board.214 An
independent director is a
non-executive director who
is not part of management
and has no other
relationship that could or
could be perceived to
materially interfere with
the independent exercise of
the director’s judgment.
The corporation should
state its reasons for
considering a director
independent if that
director:
(1) is a substantial
shareholder or associate;
(2) was employed within
the last three years as an
executive of the company
or group;
(3) was, within the last
three years, a principal of a
material professional
adviser or consultant (or an
employee materially

An earlier version of this chart was published by Paul von Nessen, see supra
NYSE Manual, supra note 95, § 303(A) (1).
Id. § 303(A) (2).
ASX Recommendations, supra note 83, at recommendation 2.1.

GABEL (DO NOT DELETE)

5/5/2010 11:16 AM

Corporate Governance

[VOL. 11: 365, 2010]

SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.

Independence of
the Chairman of
the Board

The chairman need not be
an independent director and
may simultaneously serve as
the CEO.215

Board
Committees

The company must have an
audit committee, a
nomination committee, and
a compensation committee
consisting solely of
independent directors.218

associated with providing
the service);
(4) was a material supplier
or customer (or an officer
or associate of such); or
(5) has a material
contractual relationship
with the company or
group.
The chair should be an
216
independent director,
and should not
simultaneously serve as the
CEO.217
ASX top 500 companies
must have an audit
committee.219 All other
listed companies should
have an audit committee, a
nomination committee, and
a remuneration committee,
each with a majority of
independent directors.220

215. While no law or regulation in the United States prohibits the CEO from
simultaneously serving as a non-independent director, some firms are moving towards
the identification of a “lead independent director” in an effort to demonstrate strong
governance. See, e.g., Washington Mutual, supra note 106.
216. ASX Recommendations, supra note 83, at Recommendation 2.2.
217. Id. at Recommendation 4.2 (audit committees are required for all companies in
the ASX 300 index by ASX Listing Rule 12.7).
218. NYSE Manual, supra note 95, § 303A.4–6; SEC Act, supra note 109,
§ 240.10A-3(b) (1).
219. ASX Recommendations, supra note 83, at Recommendation 4.2 (Audit
committees are required for the ASX top 300 by ASX Listing Rule 12.7).
220. ASX Recommendations, supra note 83, at Recommendations 2.4, 4.1, 8.1.

401

GABEL (DO NOT DELETE)

5/5/2010 11:16 AM

The audit committee
The audit committee of
should consist of at least
public companies must
three directors. All
consist only of
members should be nonindependent directors.221
If applicable, SOX
executive directors; a
requires the reasons for
majority of the members
declining to include at
should be independent; and
least one financial expert
the chair, who should also
must be disclosed.222
be independent, should not
However, the NYSE
also be the chair of the
requires the chair of the
board. Companies must
committee to have
disclosure the names and
accounting or financial
qualifications of audit
management expertise.223 committee members. All
The committee must
members should be
retain responsibility for
financially literate, and at
the appointment,
least one member should
compensation, and
have accounting or related
226
oversight of auditors.224
financial expertise. The
It must establish
committee should review
procedures for the
the scope, results, and cost
treatment of accounting
effectiveness of the audit;
complaints; have
the independence and
authority and funding to
objectivity of the auditors;
engage independent
and all non-audit services
advisors; and have
provided by the auditors.227
authority to approve
225
accounts.
Regulation of Internal Governance: Internal Controls and Ethics
Companies should
Assessment of
An “internal control
Internal Control
report” must be audited
establish a sound system of
and filed annually, stating risk oversight,
the responsibilities of
management, and internal
management for
control.229
Audit Committees

221. See SOX, supra note 2, § 301.
222. Id. § 407.
223. NYSE Manual, supra note 95, § 303A.07.
224. SOX, supra note 2, § 301.
225. Id.; NYSE Manual, supra note 95, § 303A.07; SEC Act, supra note 109,
§ 240.10A-3(b)(2)–(5).
226. ASX Recommendations, supra note 83, at Recommendations 4.2, 4.3.
227. ASX, Listing Rules, supra note 89, § 12.7.
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Code of Ethics

establishing and
maintaining internal
control.228
Public companies must
disclose in periodic
reports whether or not
they have adopted a code
of ethics for senior
financial officers.230

Disclosure Requirements
Accounting
Financial statements must
Standards
be prepared in accordance
with Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles
(GAAP), as promulgated
by the Financial
Accounting Standards
Board (FASB)—an
independent standard
232
setting body. However,
a movement toward
convergence with the
International Financial
Reporting Standards
(IFRS), as promulgated
by the International
Accounting Standards

229.
228.
230.
231.
232.
233.

Companies should
establish a code of conduct
to guide the directors and
key executives as to the
practices necessary to
maintain confidence in the
company’s integrity as
well as the accountability
of individuals for reporting
and investigating reports of
unethical practices. 231
Australia has adopted the
International Financial
Reporting Standards
(IFRS), as promulgated by
the International
Accounting Standards
233
Board (IASB).

ASX Recommendations, supra note 83, at Recommendation 7.1.
SOX, supra note 2, § 404.
SOX, supra note 2, § 406; NYSE Manual, supra note 95, § 303A.10.
ASX Recommendations, supra note 83, at Recommendation 3.1.
SOX, supra note 2, § 101.
ASIC Act, supra note 151, §§ 232–33.
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Off-Balance Sheet
Transactions

Officer
Certification of
Financial Reports

Continuous
Disclosure

234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
(Austl.).
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Board (IASB) is currently
under way.
U.S. GAAP permits
companies to enter into
off-balance sheet
transactions, subject to
specified limitations. But,
SOX requires all such
transactions be
disclosed.234
The CFOs and CEOs of
SEC registrants must
certify that the financial
reports “fairly present”
the company’s financial
position and do not
contain any untrue
statement or omission of
material fact.236
Each reporting public
company must disclose to
the public on a “rapid and
current basis” any
additional information
concerning material
changes in its financial
condition which is
necessary or useful for the
protection of investors
and is in the public
238
interest.

IFRS, the set of accounting
standards to which
Australia subscribes,
effectively prohibits offbalance sheet
transactions.235

Since 2004, the CFO and
CEO of listed entities must
certify to the board that
accounts present a “true
and fair” view.237

ASX listing rules require
listed companies to inform
the ASX “immediately”
when they become aware
of any information which a
reasonable person would
expect to have an effect on
the price or value of its
securities. Certain unlisted
public companies must
inform ASIC “as soon as
practical” in similar
circumstances.239

SOX, supra note 2, § 404.
See McDermott Will & Emery, supra note 131.
See SOX, supra note 2, §§ 302, 906; SEC Act, supra note 109, § 240.13a–14a.
Corporations Act, 2001, § 295A (Austl.).
SOX, supra note 2, § 409.
ASX Listing Rules, supra note 89, § 3.1; Corporations Act, 2001, § 674 (2)
Rio Tinto, supra note 140.
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Related Party Transactions
Loans to
Personal loans, with some
Directors,
exceptions, may not be
Executives, and
given by a public
Other Related
company to directors and
Parties
executives of that
company.240

Insider Trading
Disclosure

Officers, directors and
10% shareholders are
required to report changes
in ownership of securities
or the purchase/sale of a
security-based swap
242
agreement.

Consequences of Violations
Executive
To be approved by
Compensation
shareholders. CEOs and
CFOs must forfeit any
bonuses and profits
received from the sale of
company securities during
the 12 month period
following the filing of a

A public company must
obtain member approval
for loans to related parties,
subject to a number of
exceptions.241 Regulation
of non-recourse loans is
currently under
consideration.
Substantial shareholders
(5% shareholding or more)
must comply with statutory
notice provisions.243
Listed companies are
required to notify the ASX
of directors’ holdings, and
the ASX principles
recommend formulation
and disclosure of policies
concerning trading in
company securities by
directors, officers, and
employees.244
For executives, ASX
Principles recommend a
combination of fixed
remuneration, performance
based remuneration, equity
based remuneration and
termination payments.
Non-executives should

240. SOX, supra note 2, § 402.
241. Corporations Act, 2001, ch. 2E (Austl.).
242. SOX, supra note 2, § 403.
243. Corporations Act, 2001, pt. 6C.1 (Austl.).
244. ASX Listing Rules, supra note 89, § 3.19A; ASX Recommendations, supra
note 83, at Recommendation 3.2.

405

GABEL (DO NOT DELETE)

5/5/2010 11:16 AM

financial report for which
an accounting restatement
was required due to
accounting or reporting
misconduct.245

Disqualification of
Directors and
Officers

SEC may prohibit any
person from serving as an
officer or director if they
have violated certain antifraud provisions and their
conduct demonstrates
“unfitness” to serve.248

Penalties and
Disgorgement by
Officers of
Certain Profits

The SEC may seek civil
penalties for securities
laws violations, the
proceeds of which will be
diverted to accounts to
compensate victims of
related securities law
violations.250 SOX
broadened the availability
of and sentencing
guidelines for criminal

only receive fees.246 A
remuneration report for
listed companies is
statutorily required to be
considered by
shareholders, while equity
based remuneration and
termination payments are
regulated by statute and by
the ASX Listing rules.247
A person can be
disqualified under the
Corporations Act from
managing corporations for
convictions for certain
serious offenses; for
involvement in failed
corporations; while
awaiting discharge in
bankruptcy; and for
repeated contraventions of
249
the Corporations Act.
The civil penalty
provisions of the
Corporations Act now
provide a maximum civil
penalty for corporate
offenders of up to
$1 million (up from the
previous $200,000).
Compensation for losses
253
may also be provided.

245. SOX, supra note 2, § 304.
246. ASX Recommendations, supra note 83, at Recommendation 8.2, (Box 8.1).
247. Corporations Act, 2001, § 250SA, (Austl.) (remuneration report), ch. 2E (related
party benefits), ch. 2D, pt. 2 (termination payments); ASX Listing Rules, supra note 89,
§ 10.11et seq. (securities issued to persons of influence).
248. SEC Act, supra note 109, § 240.10B1.
249. Corporations Act, 2001, pt. 2D.6 (Austl.).
250. Id.
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penalties for violating
securities laws.251 It
increased the maximum
prison sentence for
falsifying or destructing
audit records to ten
years.252
Regulation of Independent Auditors
Prohibited
Registered accounting
Services
firms are prohibited from
providing non-auditing
services
contemporaneously with
an audit. Few specified
exceptions exist, but only
if pre-approved by the
audit committee. Firms
may provide non-auditing
services to a company if
the services do not exceed
5% of the total fees paid
by the company to the
254
auditor during the year.

Audit Waiting
Period

A registered public
accounting firm may not
audit a public company if
a senior finance executive
of the company was

From 2004, Professional
Standards on Independence
require the auditor to
identify threats to
independence and
safeguards to be employed.
Where non-audit services
pose too great a risk to
independence, the provider
of such services is
prohibited from being
involved in the audit.
There are disclosure
requirements on non-audit
services and explanations
of why certain services do
not compromise auditor
independence are
255
required.
Since 2004, a professional
member of an audit firm is
prohibited from becoming
a director or other
responsible officer of the

253. Corporations Act, 2001, pt. 9.4B, § 1317G (1B) (Austl.).
251. SOX, supra note 2, §§ 802 (criminal penalties for altering documents), 805
(sentencing guidelines), 807 (criminal penalties for defrauding shareholders).
252. SOX, supra note 2, § 802.
254. SOX, supra note 2, § 208; SEC Act, supra note 109, §§ 210, 240, 249, 274.
255. Corporations Act, 2001, §§ 324CA–324CH (Austl.).
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Audit Record
Retention

Auditor Influence
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employed by the firm and
that person participated in
the audit of the company
during the preceding
year.256
The lead audit partner
must be rotated every five
years.258
Auditors must retain all
audit and review work
papers for at least
seven years.260
An officer or director of a
public company is
prohibited from
fraudulently influencing
or coercing any
independent public
auditor that is performing
an audit on the
company.262

audited company within
two years of their departure
from the audit firm.257

Those with a significant
role in an audit are to be
rotated every five years.259
Auditors must retain all
audit working papers for at
least seven years.261
Since 2004, the
Corporations Act states a
general principal that there
should be auditor
independence. Auditors are
required to declare
annually to the board of
directors of an audited
company that the auditor
has maintained its
independence as required
by legislation and
professional standards.
Financial relationships
between the auditor and the
audit client are restricted,
and the auditor must
identify threats to
independence and
safeguards to be
263
employed.

256. SOX, supra note 2, § 206.
257. Corporations Act, 2001, §§ 324CI, 324CJ (Austl.).
258. SOX, supra note 2, § 203.
259. Corporations Act, 2001, § 324 DA (Austl.).
260. SOX, supra note 2, § 103; SEC Act, supra note 109, § 210.2-06 (a).
261. Corporations Act, 2001, § 307B (Austl.).
262. SOX, supra note 2, § 303; SEC Act, supra note 109, § 240.13b2-2(b) (1), (b)
(2), (2) (c).
263. Corporations Act, 2001, §§ 307AC, 300(11B), 307C (Austl.).
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Accounting
Oversight

264.
265.

SOX created the Public
Company Accounting
Oversight Board
(PCAOB), a five-member
board independent of the
accounting profession and
overseen by the SEC, to
set auditing, quality
control, and independence
264
standards.

In 2004, CLERP 9
expanded the
responsibilities of the
Financial Reporting
Council to oversee the
setting of auditing
standards, advise on
auditor independence,
monitor the adequacy of
the systems and processes
used by audit firms to
assure audit independence,
promote the teaching of
professional and business
ethics, and monitor the
adequacy of disciplinary
265
procedures.

SOX, supra note 2, § 101.
ASIC Act, supra note 151.
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